On 24 January 2026, the Ministry of National Defense dropped a bombshell: Zhang Youxia 张又侠 and Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli 刘振立 were both under formal investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law” – which as even a three-year-old would know, is the party’s all-purpose euphemism for corruption, graft, disloyalty, or any combo that gets you erased from the lineup.
Nope, it wasn’t a golden handshake or “health retirement.” Zhang Youxia, at 75, was already way past the PLA’s usual 68–70 retirement cliff for top brass. Xi had personally kept him on in 2022, bumping him to first-ranked CMC vice chairman – basically the No. 2 uniformed guy, Xi’s right-hand military princeling with the revolutionary bloodline (their dads fought together in Shaanxi), real Laoshan battlefield scars from ’84, and years running equipment procurement/modernisation. Everyone saw it as ironclad trust: the last senior officer with actual war experience, the guy Xi could count on when he gutted the rest of the CMC in waves of purges.
Yet six days later (as of Jan 30, 2026), the PLA Daily was running front-page editorials blasting him for “seriously trampling the CMC chairman responsibility system,” “fueling political and corruption problems that threaten the Party’s absolute leadership,” “severely damaging CMC prestige,” and wrecking “combat readiness and political ecology.” That’s not just bribe-in-a-briefcase talk – it’s loaded language accusing him of undermining Xi’s personal command authority, the one red line you don’t cross if you value your life. Hold this thought. It’s important. Below is a short biography of Zhang Youxia.
Zhang Youxia (born July 1950 in Beijing, ancestral home Weinan, Shaanxi) is one of those classic PLA “princeling” figures – son of General Zhang Zongxun, one of the 1955 shangjiang (top-tier founding generals). His dad fought alongside Xi Jinping’s father back in the revolutionary days in Shaanxi, so there’s that old comrades network thing going on.
He enlisted in the PLA at 18 in late 1968, straight into the 14th Army’s 40th Division. Party member by 1969. Climbed the usual ladder: soldier → squad leader → platoon → company commander.
What sets him apart from most of today’s top brass is actual combat experience. He saw action in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War (the “self-defensive counterattack” as Beijing calls it), and more importantly commanded units in the brutal 1984 Laoshan battles during the follow-on border clashes. That frontline record helped fast-track his promotions in the 1980s.
After that:
- Rose through regimental and divisional posts in the 14th Group Army.
- 1994–2000: Deputy commander, 13th Group Army.
- 2000–2005: Commander, 13th Group Army.
- 2005–2007: Deputy commander, Beijing Military Region.
- 2007–2012: Commander, Shenyang Military Region.
Made full general in 2011. Then in 2012 moved to head the General Armaments Department (later CMC Equipment Development Department post-2015 reforms), basically in charge of weapons R&D, procurement, and tech upgrades – ironic given his dad’s earlier logistics/equipment roles.
Under Xi, things accelerated:
- 2012: CMC member.
- 2017: Politburo + 2nd-ranked CMC vice chairman (CCP side).
- 2018: Also state CMC vice chairman.
- 2022: Stayed on past normal retirement age (he was already 72), bumped up to 1st-ranked CMC vice chairman – basically Xi’s most trusted military right-hand man.
What’s extraordinary: His long stay in the top brass beyond the usual 68–70 cutoff screams deep personal trust from Xi – revolutionary family ties, shared provincial roots, battlefield cred, and presumably loyalty during the big military shake-up and anti-graft storm. But “loyalty” cuts both ways in these purges.
Bottom line: Zhang’s arc is textbook – red-family pedigree + genuine combat chops + political alignment → top-tier power – until the sudden investigation flipped the script. Classic reminder that in the PLA under Xi, no one’s position is ever truly safe, no matter how “princeling” or battle-tested you are.
Multiple layers to unpack here:
- The official corruption narrative – Fits the pattern. Equipment Development Department (where Zhang Youxia sat for years) has been a massive graft honeypot – think kickbacks on fighter jets, missiles, ships. Ties to fallen ex-Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s 李尚福 procurement scandals are whispered. But if it was purely money, why the delay? You mean the government didn’t know about this when he was retained and promoted? Why now, after Xi extended his tenure not once but twice?
- Power-consolidation nuclear option – Xi’s been methodically dismantling the 2022 CMC slate. Original seven members: only Xi and discipline enforcer Zhang Shengmin (zero ops/combat background) remain. He Weidong 何卫东, Miao Hua 苗华, Li Shangfu 李尚福– gone earlier. Purging even his oldest, battle-tested ally screams “no one is untouchable.” Analysts call it peak paranoia or peak control: Xi wants zero potential rivals or veto players, especially heading into 2027 (PLA 100th anniversary, key modernization deadline) and the 21st Party Congress. The CMC is now thinner than ever – basically Xi + one loyalist – command opacity just spiked.
- Commander Hesitation – Some PLA-watchers point to deeper rifts. Zhang Youxia (with his real-war cred) and prudent Liu Zhenli may have resisted or slow-rolled Xi’s aggressive joint-operations training timelines and readiness benchmarks for near-term contingencies (Taiwan). The “five serious” accusations hint at insubordination. If Zhang Youxia was the voice saying “we’re not ready for Taiwan yet” or pushing more measured modernization, that could explain Xi’s cutting off the nose to spite the face response. It could mean that Xi was determined to take Taiwan by 2027 and he’s going ahead without Zhang Youxia.
- Wild rumours and denials – The Wall Street Journal spun something about Zhang Youxia leaking China’s nuclear secrets to the US. Many wishful dissidents saw this as a likely coup with rumours of military units surrounding Beijing but all that would only happen in a dream.
Imagine what Zhang Youxia’s retirement would look like. He probably has enough to last the next two generations. Why would he need to sell Chinese military secrets? Doesn’t make sense.
Bottom line: It’s not about retirement or corruption. Xi is purging for absolute Taiwan 2027 readiness, snuffing hesitation on the part of his military commanders.
