Can Hamas Be Trusted?

Here’s a detailed, fact-based look at the main signs and patterns that have led Israel, Egypt, the U.S., and others to conclude that Hamas cannot (currently) be fully trusted in a peace deal.


Hamas Terrorists

⚠️ 1. Rejection of Israel’s Right to Exist

  • Hamas’s 1988 Charter explicitly called for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state “from the river to the sea.”
  • In 2017, Hamas issued a new political document that softened its tone but still refused to recognize Israel, referring only to a “temporary state” within 1967 borders as a tactical step, not a final peace.
  • Unlike the PLO, Hamas has never officially recognized Israel or signed any mutual recognition agreement.

⚠️ 2. Continued Commitment to Armed Struggle

  • Hamas maintains that “resistance” (including armed struggle) is a legitimate and permanent right.
  • Even during truces (“hudnas”), Hamas continues to stockpile rockets, dig tunnels, and train fighters.
  • These preparations indicate that Hamas views any ceasefire as temporary and tactical, not as a step toward reconciliation.

⚠️ 3. Track Record of Violating Ceasefires

  • Since 2005, multiple ceasefire agreements have been brokered — often through Egypt or Qatar.
  • Each time, rockets or border attacks have resumed within weeks or months.
  • Even when Hamas claims other groups (like Islamic Jihad) were responsible, Israel and international observers often find evidence of Hamas’s complicity or tolerance.

⚠️ 4. Use of Civilian Areas for Military Purposes

  • Hamas has been repeatedly documented (by the UN, Human Rights Watch, and independent journalists) firing rockets from schools, hospitals, and residential zones.
  • It has also diverted humanitarian aid — cement, fuel, and pipes — to military use (tunnels, bunkers, rockets).
  • Such conduct undermines any confidence in Hamas’s willingness to abide by agreements protecting civilians.

⚠️ 5. Internal Repression and Lack of Transparency

  • Hamas rules Gaza as an authoritarian entity, jailing or executing opponents, including members of Fatah.
  • Its governance is opaque, with no real accountability for funds or foreign aid.
  • This makes it extremely difficult for mediators to verify compliance with peace terms.

⚠️ 6. Double Messaging

  • Hamas leaders often use moderate language in English or to foreign diplomats, while issuing radical and militant rhetoric in Arabic to local audiences.
  • For example, statements praising “martyrdom operations” or “the liberation of all Palestine” continue to appear in official media.
  • This pattern mirrors the “dual discourse” that previously eroded trust in the PLO during the Oslo years.

⚠️ 7. Ties to Iran and Other Armed Groups

  • Hamas receives funding, weapons, and training from Iran — a state openly committed to Israel’s destruction.
  • It also maintains operational links with Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, both designated terrorist organizations.
  • Such alliances raise doubts about Hamas’s independence and its sincerity in pursuing peaceful coexistence.

💬 Bottom Line

While some Hamas political leaders occasionally signal interest in long-term truces, the organization’s core ideology, actions, and alliances have consistently contradicted genuine peace intentions.
Until Hamas unequivocally recognizes Israel, abandons armed struggle, and allows transparent governance, most regional and Western governments see it as an unreliable partner in any lasting peace deal.

Bill_Clinton,_Yitzhak_Rabin,_Yasser_Arafat_at_the_White_House_1993-09-13

🔹 Official Policy vs. Reality

After the Oslo Accords, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally recognized Israel’s right to exist and renounced terrorism.

  • Arafat, as Chairman of the PLO, pledged to prevent violence and to discipline groups that attacked Israelis.
  • The newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA), dominated by Fatah (Arafat’s faction), was meant to maintain order in Palestinian areas.

However, the PLO was a coalition of several factions — not all of them followed Arafat’s lead.


🔹 Continued Attacks (1993–2000)

  1. Radical PLO factions, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), rejected Oslo and continued armed operations against Israel.
  2. Some Fatah elements — even within Arafat’s own security apparatus — were accused by Israel and Western intelligence of covertly aiding or tolerating attacks.
  3. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which were outside the PLO, escalated suicide bombings in the mid-1990s. Israel accused the PA of failing to stop them, or even turning a blind eye at times.

🔹 Evidence of “Secret” or Tacit Support

  • Israeli and U.S. intelligence reported that Arafat’s security services occasionally provided weapons or intelligence to militant cells, especially during moments of political tension.
  • The Tanzim militia (a Fatah offshoot) and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, both linked to Arafat’s Fatah movement, carried out attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s — especially during the Second Intifada (2000–2005).
  • Arafat himself often used ambiguous language, condemning violence in English but praising “martyrs” in Arabic speeches, leading critics to accuse him of double-speak.

🔹 Conclusion

So while Arafat and the PLO leadership officially committed to peace, parts of the organization — and allied groups under its umbrella — continued armed attacks or quietly supported those who did.
This dual strategy eroded Israeli trust and became one of the reasons Oslo eventually collapsed by the early 2000s.

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